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by James Petras
 Introduction: Escalation of Warfare
To understand US-Latin American relations this year and its likely trajectory in 2007 it is obligatory to consider three dimensions:
1) the global context of US-LA relations;
2) internal dynamics of the US and
3) the real practical political-economic consequences of the 2006 elections in Latin America.
US imperial policy continues to pursue military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, to give unconditional support to Israel’s war against the elected Palestinian Government and to threaten a direct or Israeli attack on Iran. In other words, the prolonged, costly and inconclusive wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine during 2006 will continue in 2007. Further military escalation, includes increased US troops and spending for wars in the Middle East; an extra $800 million USD in addition to the annual $3 billion USD for Israeli war plans against Lebanon, Palestine and especially Iran. Those commentators who interpreted US policy via public opinion polls, electoral processes (the victory of the Democrats), advisory reports (Baker’s Iraq Study Group) and casualty rates in Iraq, and predicted a ‘gradual’ withdrawal, failed to understand the logic of the White House’s political strategy. For the Bush regime, the military failures are a result of the application of insufficient power: what is necessary, they argue, is greater numbers of soldiers and bigger military budgets (BBC 12/16/06).
Polarization
Both in the United States, Latin America and in the world at large,
profound and deepening divisions are driving policy and provoking
increasing conflicts. The lines of division in the United States on the
fundamental questions of confrontation or negotiation in the Middle
East and Latin America cut across the two major parties, and the
liberal-conservative spectrum. On the one side the White House, backed
by pro-war Democrats, Republicans, the Presidents of the Major Jewish
Organizations, right-wing veteran groups and neo-conservative
intellectuals and the majority of the corporate mass media. On the
other side, minorities in the major parties and mass media, the
majority of public opinion, sectors of the active and retired military
officers, establishment intellectual and prominent political critics of
the Zionist lobby and war policies like Brzezinski, James Carter, James
Baker among others.
Similar divisions appear with regard to Latin American policy. The
White House, backed by the Cuban (exile) lobby, the Pentagon and a
minority of right-wing ideologues and business groups favor forceful
pressure and intervention against Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia and
support of illegitimate President Calderon, the Santa Cruz separatists
in Bolivia and other authoritarian extremists in the region. In varying
degrees of opposition, stand liberal and conservative congress-members
backed by agro-business exporters, tourists agencies, a majority of
public opinion and sectors of the State Department headed by
Undersecretary for Latin American Affairs, Shannon, who support greater
emphasis on diplomacy, negotiations and a ‘two-track’ approach.
Within Latin America similar profound divisions emerged in 2006 which
will deepen in 2007. In Mexico, the minority Calderon regime faces
major opposition from the AMLO coalition, Oaxaca popular assemblies,
the trade unions and social movements. As he proceeds to deepen the
liberalization of the economy and he militarizes the country to
implement his program, the polarization will deepen.
In Bolivia, rightwing business and agro-business elites regrouped,
taking advantage of Morales conciliatory policies and incapacity to
carry-out any major redistributive policies (in land and income) – and
have consolidated a power base in Santa Cruz, which has forced Morales
to retreat further in his reforms and aroused mass popular discontent.
Similar divisions have appeared in Ecuador, between the
peasants/Indians of the Andean region and the land barons and bankers
of the Coast. In Colombia the divisions between the paramilitary forces
allied to President Uribe and the popular civil society organizations
(and the guerrilla) have deepened (Boston Globe
December 14, 2006). In Venezuela the polarization between the Socialist
and social-liberal Chavistas(and their allies among the ‘moderate’
opposition) will surface in 2007 as Chavez implements party and cabinet
changes in pursuit of a socialist agenda.
These internal divisions in the US and Latin America are played out in
an international context which radicalizes the class and national
confrontations.
International Context
Two world-historic processes affect US policy toward Latin
America: 1) the prolonged Middle East wars and 2) the dynamic growth of
the four Asian powers led by China. The Middle Eastern/South Asian wars
have severely overextended US military forces, undermined domestic
support for new wars and severely strained the budget. These outcomes
have weakened the US military capacity for intervention in Latin
America in support of a military coup, or, even less, a direct military
invasion. As a result the US increasingly relies on domestic (Latin
American) clients to defend its interests (Calderon, Santa Cruz
land/business barons, Garcia, Uribe).
Asia’s (particularly China and India) dynamic growth and demand for raw
materials (iron, copper and oil), food and agricultural products (like
soya) has resulted in greater competition
with the US/EU for access to Latin American exporters and suppliers,
and increased prices and revenues for Latin American treasuries (major
trade and budget surpluses). Asia increases the diversity of markets
and investors for Latin American exporters. These changes mean less
dependence on external financing (especially the IMF) and US markets
which in turn means Washington has less political and diplomatic
leverage over Latin American regimes, even neo-liberal governments like
Lula, Bachelet, Kirchner and Vazquez.
Faced with a loss
of military capacity and a decline in economic leverage, Washington is
moving toward a ‘compromise’ between the White House’s hard line
militarists and the State Department’s market-driven ‘negotiators’. The
essence of the compromise is to pursue a ‘two-track policy’: combining
support for the subversive opposition in countries where it is strong
(Bolivia) with negotiation in countries where it is weak (Venezuela).
With regard to the neo-liberal regimes, which have some degree of
autonomy (Brazil, Chile and Argentina), Washington will emphasize
bilateral relations and try to maximize economic opportunities while
discouraging any concession to the mass movements especially demands to
reverse privatizations. The two-track policy will be combined in the
cases of Cuba and Venezuela: with promises of dialogue and agreements conditional on major concessions in diplomacy, property and investments combined with continued financial support for agents of destabilization.
Latin America: Political Changes and US Response
The mild response of the US to the regime changes resulting from the
Latin American elections of 2006 can easily be explained by the fact
that they did not produce any consequential socio-economic structural changes, at least for the foreseeable future.
The clearest demonstration of the marginal effects of ‘center-left’
electoral victories is the case of the electoral victory of Lula who
made it clear to even his own most ardent intellectual supporters (Frei
Betto, Emir Sader, Joao Pedro Stedile) that he considered ‘leftism an
infantile disorder’ (La Jornada
12/14/2006), a remark much appreciated in business circles throughout
the hemisphere. No doubt Wall Street was pleased that the Brazilian
‘Workers Party’ voted to double Congressional salaries from$6500 USD to
$12000 USD per month (and doubling each Congress member’s individual
monthly budget to $75,000 USD) while increasing the minimum wage by $7
USD a month from $159 to $166USD (about 1.7% after inflation) (Financial Times
December 16-17, 2006). One out of five Brazilian Congress members (many
from Lula’s coalition) are currently under investigation for
corruption. Wall Street speculators who also were recently investigated
for fraud and yet received huge year-end bonuses would feel a real
identity of condition with Brazilian lawmakers who doubled their
salaries, while awaiting criminal charges.
Contrary to
White House expectations, but much to its liking, Evo Morales’ regime
pursued orthodox, austere fiscal policies aimed at budget surpluses,
eschewed any redistributive policies (virtually no land, mining or
energy expropriations). While Morales demobilized the social movements
and focused on endless legal procedures, the oligarchy regrouped,
expanded its power base in Santa Cruz and threatens to bring down the
government. While Washington’s oligarchic Bolivian clients advanced
toward power (La Jornada
December 16, 2006) Evo Morales continued his self-destructive policies
of symbolic radical populist rhetoric and greater concessions to the
elites. Washington has maintained a foot in both camps, providing over
$60 million dollars in foreign aid to Morales and untold millions to
the opposition in Santa Cruz organizing massive ‘separatist’
demonstrations (HoyBolivia.com December 16, 2006).
Washington’s ‘soft-line’ negotiators (Shannon) strengthened their
position vis-a-vis the White House’s ‘hard line’ policy toward
Venezuela by pointing to Hugo Chavez’ electoral victory (63% of the
vote) as a reason for a rapprochement (La Jornada, December 14, 2006). Shannon has advanced the argument in Washington that a significant sector of the Chavez government
was open to a negotiated pact with involves freezing the status quo,
softening criticism of US imperial policies, consolidating oil and gas
agreements and blocking any steps toward socializing the economy.
Perspectives for 2007
The international position of the US during 2007 will continue to
deteriorate – the coming massive military escalation in Iraq, the
large-scale transfer of arms for Israel to threaten or attack Iran,
Syria, Hezbollah or Hamas (or all simultaneously) – will not lessen the
armed resistance in Iraq. A US-backed Israeli attack on Iran will
extend warfare throughout the Gulf States including Saudi Arabia. On
December 15, 2006, Bush presented the Presidential Medal of Freedom to
Israeli extremist, Natan Sharansky– advocate for the genocidal
‘transfer’ of all Palestinians from ‘Greater Israel’ – symbolizing the
meeting of the minds of US imperial militarism and Israeli brutal
colonial expansionism. The total discarding of any new diplomatic
initiative (like the recommendations of Baker’s Iraq Study Group), is
the result of the combined strength of the powerful pro-Israel Lobby
and the Bush-Cheney-Rice White House.
Washington, overextended militarily in the Middle East, will follow its
‘two-track’ policy in Latin America. The White House will support
incumbent clients (like Uribe, Calderon and Garcia); the State,
Treasury and Commerce Departments will engage in trade agreements with
more ‘autonomous’ neo-liberal regimes like Lula, Bachelet, Vazquez and
Kirchner), encouraging greater distance from Cuba and Venezuela and
closer diplomatic relations with the US. With regard to Bolivia,
Washington will continue to pressure Morales to make further
concessions to the far-right civic-oligarchic coalition based in Santa
Cruz, allowing the local business elite to ‘carry the ball’ for US
imperial interests. In Venezuela, the ‘two track policy’ will attempt
to deepen the political divisions in the Chavista movement, in order to
block new Chavez initiatives toward greater socialization and in order
to promote new political configuration of ‘moderate oppositionists’ and
liberal Chavistas.
The weakest link in Washington’s projected strategy in Latin America is
the re-emergence of socio-political movements, like those which burst
forth in the late 1990’s and first years of the new century: The MST in
Brazil, the workers, peasant and Indian movements in Bolivia and
Ecuador and the mass uprising in Oaxaca and electoral protests in
Mexico are in the process of re-grouping, none having suffered a
historic defeat. All the major popular movements retain their
organizational structures and have recovered their political
independence. They will soon be capable of once again engaging in major
uprisings and political confrontations with the oligarchies in power or
with their shock troops in the streets.
The New Year does not promise ‘more of the same’: it will start with a
major US military escalation in the Middle East but it will likely end
with a greater military debacle, ensuring deepening political crises
and increased economic instability both in the Middle East, the US and
Latin America. The weakening of the US political regime will open a
window of opportunity for a decisive break
with the US Empire, providing that the re-emerging social-political
movements can overcome the obstacles posed by the new political elites
of ex-leftists and traditional oligarchs.
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