Persistent low interest rates and low inflation expectations led to a
binge in borrowing and to a vast increase in market valuation, not only
in real estate but also in stocks and bonds. Banks and other mortgage
lending institutions took advantage of the opportunity to introduce
some financial innovations in order to finance the exploding mortgage
market. These innovations resulted in the severing of the traditional
direct link between borrower and lender and the reduction in the
lending risk normally associated with mortgage loans.
Thus, with the connivance of the rating agencies and of the Federal
Reserve System, large banks invented new financial products under
various names such as "Collateralized Bond Obligations" (CBOs),
"Collateralized Debt Obligations" (CDOs), also called
"Structured Investment Vehicles" (SIVs),
which had the characteristics of unfunded short term commercial paper.
In the residential mortgage market, for example, mortgage brokers and
retail lenders would sell their mortgage loans to banks, which in turn
would package them together and slice them into different classes of
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), carrying different levels of risk
and return, before selling them to investors.
Indeed, these new financial instruments were the end result of a
process of "asset securitization" and were slices of bundles of loans,
not only of mortgage loans but also of credit cards debts, car loans,
student loans and other receivables. Each slice carried a different
risk load and a different yield. With the blessing of rating agencies,
banks went even one step further, and they began pooling the more risky
financial slices into more risky bundles and divided them again to be
sold to investors in search of high yields.
By selling these new debt instruments to
investors in search of high yields and higher yields, including hedged
funds and pension funds, banks were doubly rewarded. First, they
collected handsome managing fees for their efforts. But second, and
more importantly, they unloaded the risk of lending to the unsuspected
buyer of such securities, because in case of default on the original
loans, the banks would be scot-free. They had already been paid and had
been released from the risk of default and foreclosure on the original
loans.
The banks' residual role was to collect and distribute interest, as
long as borrowers made their interest payments. But if payments
stopped, the capital losses incurred because of the decline in the
value of unperforming loans would instead be carried by the investors
in CBOs and CDOs. The banks themselves would suffer no losses and would
be free to use their capital bases to engage in additional profitable
lending. In fact, the end of the line investors became the real
mortgage lenders (without reaping all the rewards of such risky loans)
and the banks could reuse their capital to pyramid upward their loan
operations. These were the best of times for banks and they gorged
themselves without restraint. Some of them paid their employees tens of
billions of dollars in
year-end bonuses.
Indeed, and it is here that the Fed and other regulatory agencies
failed, first line mortgage lenders became more and more aggressive in
their lending, with the full knowledge that they could profitably
unload the risk downstream. This explains the expansion of the
"subprime" mortgage market where borrowing was done with no down
payment, no interest payments for a while and no questions asked as to
the income and creditworthiness of the borrower. These were not normal
lending practices. Such
Ponzi schemes could
not last forever. And when housing prices started to decline,
foreclosures also increased, thus shaking the new financial house of
cards to its foundations. Banks became the reluctant owners of some of
the foreclosed properties at very discounted values.
Why then are so many banks in financial difficulties, if the lending
risk was transferred to unsuspecting investors? Essentially, because
when the housing boom burst, the banks' inventory of unsold
"asset-backed securities" was unusually high. When the piper stopped
playing and investors stopped buying the newly created risky
investments, their value plummeted overnight and banks were left with
huge losses still not fully reflected in their financial balance
sheets. Indeed, banks that did not unload their stocks of packaged
mortgages were forced to accept ownership of foreclose properties at
very discounted values. With little or no collateral behind the loans,
bad-debt losses became unavoidable.
Since noboby knows for sure the value of something which is not traded,
it will take months before banks come to terms with the total losses
they have suffered in their stocks of unsold pre-packaged "asset-based
securities". It is more than a normal "liquidity crisis" or "credit
crunch" (which results when banks borrow short term and invest in
illiquid long term assets); it is more like a
"solvency crisis"
if the banks' capital base is overtaken by the disclosure of huge
financial losses incurred when the banks are forced to sell mortgaged
assets in a depressed real estate market.
This is this financial and banking mess which is unfolding under our
very eyes and which is threatening the American and international
financial system. There are four classes of losers. First, the
homebuyers who bought properties at inflated prices with little or no
down payment and who now face foreclosure. Second, the investors who
bought illiquid mortgage-backed commercial paper and who stand to lose
part or all of their investments. Third, the holders of bank stocks who
profited when the system worked smoothly but who now face declining
stock values. And, finally, anybody who stands to fall victim, directly
or indirectly, to the coming economic slowdown.
Rodrigue Tremblay is a Canadian economist who lives in Montreal; he can be reached at rodrigue.tremblay@yahoo.com. Visit his blog site at: www.thenewamericanempire.com/blog and check Dr. Tremblay's coming book "The Code for Global Ethics" at: www.TheCodeForGlobalEthics.com/