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by Nicola Nasser
Discreetly but progressively and confidently the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is expanding south and southeast almost uncontested — after the collapse of the former USSR-led Warsaw Pact — outside the mandate designated by its statute into the Arab Middle East as well as into the Caspian Sea regions.
However, the U.S. obsession with the Iranian threat and with finding an exit strategy from the Iraqi quagmire made Washington less attentive to Turkey’s legitimate vital national interests, thus insensitively antagonizing the alliance’s southern strong arm and alerting it into the defensive, not against enemies, but against its own allies. Turkey now stands in the eye of a storm created by this same ally, a storm threatening a geopolitical fall out between the two NATO allies since 1952.
NATO has already secured its presence on the middle tier between the two regions, in Turkey (a member), Afghanistan (where it has a 25.000-strong force) and to a lesser extent in Iraq where the western alliance is training the “new Iraqi army.”
The contesting French influence had eased when former President Jacque Chirac near the end of his term shifted to coordinating with the United States in Lebanon; the French contest, particularly on the African theatre and especially on NATO’s northern Arab tier seems to have been completely neutralized with the electoral victory of the new President Nicolas Sarkozy, who chose to engage Washington as a “friend” and decided to rejoin NATO’s military structure.
The absence of any credible indigenous system rules out any worthwhile obstacles to NATO expansion from within the Arab Middle East region. The League of Arab States is practically no more than a fractured, division-burdened high level forum of a regional gathering structure with no teeth at all, threatened by the US-Israeli strategic alliance and the NATO with disintegration into an alternative wider “Greater Middle East” security structure that would embrace Israel as an integral leading partner.
The expansion southward was highlighted on October 9 with the signing of a treaty with Egypt at NATO’s headquarters in Brussels, “in a move that opens the door for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be involved in security matters along Egypt's border with Gaza (Strip),” according to the Jerusalem Post the next day, to possibly secure in particular the Salahuddin Passage (Philadelphi Route) according to Ynet. Egypt has become the second Middle Eastern country to sign a treaty with NATO after a similar treaty with Israel in 2006.
Both treaties with Egypt and Israel were initiated under the
Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP), which aim at “promoting
political and military ties with the Euro-Atlantic and the
Mediterranean regions along with security cooperation with NATO and MD
partners, in order to enhance Mediterranean regional security and
stability,” NATO said in the statement.
The ICP was upgraded
from the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which was adopted by
the NATO summit in Istanbul on 28-29 June 2004 with an eye on the Arab
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to have priority in
joining the alliance in partnership arrangements. Both the ICP and ICI
were conceived as mechanisms to bypass the NATO statute, which confines
its expansion to Europe and the North Atlantic regions.
The
Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was the vehicle the NATO used to approach
partnership arrangements in the region. This dialogue was originally
initiated by European founders of NATO to promote economic and
political cooperation with the southern Arab neighbors; in 2002 the MD
was upgraded to security matters of concern and in 2004 NATO elevated
its dialogue status to conceived genuine partnerships and an expanded
framework of cooperation. The MD branched off the much older European –
Arab dialogue, which began in the last quarter of the 20th century as
an economic, political and cultural forum that has nothing to do with
NATO or military prospects.
The ICP produced the Egyptian and
Israeli treaties; the ICI had earlier produced cooperation arrangements
with seven MD countries, namely Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan; similar cooperation was arranged with non-MD
members of the GCC, namely Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia
(which became an ICI partner in January). Since July 2005, the NATO has
also provided air transport for peacekeeping forces in Sudan’s volatile
Darfur region.
Areas of both ICP and ICI cooperation
arrangements include joint military war games, military training,
defense reform, war on terror, countering Islamist militancy, military
and security intelligence sharing, control of borders, demilitarization
of the surplus of old and obsolete ammunition stockpiles and Unexploded
Ordnance (UXO), serving NATO ships at partners’ seaports, hosting
NATO-supported regional Security Cooperation Centre/s, providing
logistical support to NATO’s peacekeeping operations, helping NATO in
patrolling the Mediterranean Sea and regional waters, countering the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, “to get these states closer to
NATO's way of thinking” according to a NATO official, opening NATO
defense colleges to partners' military officers, and other mechanisms
to enhance practical cooperation on regional stability and security.
Initially
adopting a low-key approach, NATO now feels more confident to send its
Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and his deputy on
unprecedented public visits to Algeria and other ICP and ICI “partners.”
Scheffer
may be officially warmly or cordially welcomed, but on the popular
level NATO is conceived as a U.S. tool to prolong both American grip on
Arab oil and Israeli grab of Arab land. Accordingly its presence in the
region is abhorred and is fomenting further deep-seated
anti-Americanism because of the U.S. invasion and military occupation
of Iraq and the U.S. limitless support to the Israeli occupation in
Palestine, Syria and Lebanon.
Specifically, NATO’s treaties with
Egypt and Israel, its cooperation with Jordan, with Lebanon falling
within its mandate and the around the clock NATO patrols in the
Mediterranean is in practice creating an external NATO wall that
reinforces the internal military occupation walls Israel is erecting to
tighten the siege it imposes on the Palestinian people.
Interrupting, Disrupting Kurdish – Turkish Crisis
However,
“Just as the White House claims it has finally turned the corner in
what it defines as the ‘central front’ in the ‘war on terror’ - Iraq -
it has found itself desperately trying to contain new crises on the
war's periphery stretching east to Pakistan, west to Turkey and south
to the Horn of Africa,” Jim Lobe wrote in Asia Times on November 10.
To
prove his point, Lobe cited Pakistani President General Pervez
Musharraf's latest “coup,” the continuing threat of a Turkish invasion
of Iraqi Kurdistan, the looming probability of war between U.S.-backed
Ethiopia and Eritrea, “amid a lack of concrete progress on the
Israel-Palestinian peace process, the ongoing political impasse in
Lebanon, and still-mounting tensions between Iran and the U.S.” and
amid an anti-Americanism that now pervades the entire region.
This
is for sure an unwelcoming environment for NATO, but at the same time
an environment that the U.S. leading NATO player will use as the raison
d’etre for dragging the North Atlantic Alliance into even more expanded
role in the region.
“The situation along the border between
Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan most directly threatens the administration's
efforts to stabilize Iraq,” said Lobe, but this is exactly where the
NATO’s gradual, confident and successful expansion south could be
curtailed, hindered and face problems because the US double-standard
policies vis-à-vis what Washington herself list as “terrorist
organizations” as well as her regional hegemonic plans pit the alliance
against its Turkish founding member or at least create an environment
conducive to a collision course between the two allies.
In
October, Turkey's parliament overwhelmingly voted 507 to 19 in favor of
ordering the army to launch an offensive across Turkey's south-eastern
border in search of P.K.K. Turkish-Kurd rebels hiding in Iraqi
Kurdistan. The Turks made no less than 24 attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan
since 1984, but without effect. The P.K.K. guerrillas could easily
disappear in the rugged mountain terrain of the Qandil Mountains.
Now
the Turks are after their “terrorist-harboring” Iraqi-Kurdish hosts as
well, who were securing a safe haven for Kurdish rebels, demanding
their extradition, a demand that the U.S.-allied Kurdish Iraqi
President, Jalal Talibani, and the President of the Kurdistan Regional
Government, Masoud Barzani, had categorically rejected and, motivated
by seemingly Pan-Kurdish loyalties, announced their readiness to fight
back any Turkish military incursion into their territories.
The
prospect of a Turkish – Kurdish war that could embroil the Iraqi Kurds,
the only trusted Iraqi ally supporting the U.S. occupation, and
destabilize the only stable Iraqi region of Kurdistan to open a new
front with a potential new flood of Iraqi refugees, this time Kurds, is
a nightmare for the U.S. Washington can ill-afford to lose the support
of either the Iraqi Kurds or that of the Turkish government across the
border; both play a vital role in supporting the U.S. war effort in
Iraq.
“With American troops already stretched thin and U.S.
military leaders not trusting most Arab-dominated units of the Iraqi
armed forces, the United States has relied extensively on Kurdish
forces for counter-insurgency operations throughout Iraq,” Stephen
Zunes wrote in the “Foreign Policy in Focus” on October 25.
US Double-standards
Meanwhile
Washington has turned her eyes away from the fact that Iraqi Kurdistan
has become a safe haven for organizations outlawed by the US as
“terrorist” groups. The U.S.-backed Iraqi Kurds were honest to their
rhetoric of Pan-Kurdish nationalism and turned their U.S.-protected
region into a base for Kurdish rebels from and against neighboring
countries. The U.S.-outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (P.K.K.) took on
Turkey; but a U.S.-sponsored Iranian Kurdish group known as PEJAK took
on Iran.
Washington also turned a blind eye to the fact that
P.K.K. since two years has become the mother organization of four
splinter groups each of them working separately but in coordination in
Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq.
On Oct. 28, the turkishweekly.net
quoted the author of the forthcoming book “The Iran Agenda: the Real
Story of U.S. Policy and the Middle East Crisis,” Reese Erlich, as
saying that, “Kurdish and American sources say the United States has
been supporting guerilla raids against Iran, channeling the money
through organizations in Iraqi Kurdistan.” Writing in the latest issue
of Mother Jones, Erlich reported that the P.K.K., which is listed on
the United States State Department List of Terrorist Organizations,
“about two years ago split into four parties in each of the countries
where the Kurds live” in Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran. “So the P.J.A.K.
is the Iranian affiliate. Basically they're still part of the same
organization.” He added that the United States accommodates the
presence of the P.K.K. in Iraq, but opposes its actions in Turkey,
while on the other hand it supports attacks by P.K.K.’s splinter group
on Iran.
Osman Ocalan, brother of the imprisoned P.K.K. leader
Abdullah Ocalan, told AP last week that some fighters had moved toward
Iran, and that there were now more P.K.K. fighters there than in
northern Iraq. “P.K.K. forces are split into three parts situated in
Turkey, Iraq and Iran,” Ocalan said. “If there is Turkish pressure on
our forces in Iraq, the fighters will head toward Iran.” How could this
free movement on Iraqi soil be possible without accommodation by the US
occupying power and their Iraqi Kurdish arms?
Iraqi Kurds’
Pan-Kurdish “solidarity” with their Turkish, Iranian and Syrian
compatriots is undercutting U.S. efforts to contain further
deterioration in its ties with Turkey. Two weeks ago, Iraq’s Kurdish
President, Jalal Talabani, said that Iraq could not solve Turkey’s
problems. “The handing over of P.K.K. leaders to Turkey is a dream that
will never be realized,” he said.
Washington seems caught
between Iraq and a hard Turkish place, with whom relations are already
thinly stretched by the recent U.S. Congress resolution declaring the
mass killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks 90 years ago a Turkish
“genocide.” A recent German Marshall Fund poll found that only 11
percent of Turks have positive views of the United States. One of the
main factors in the extraordinary growth of anti-U.S. sentiment among
the Turks was the U.S. unwillingness to pressure its ally Barzani to
stop the P.K.K. from crossing into Turkey.
President George W.
Bush spelled out U.S. opposition to a Turkish invasion of northern
Iraq. Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyep Erdogan was infuriated to
declare that the future of bilateral ties with the U.S. will be
determined by Washington’s active involvement against the P.K.K.,
without “double-standards,” in accordance with U.S. law that labels it
as a terrorist organization. Erdogan returned disappointed from his
November 5 summit with Bush in Washington; the crisis lingers on as
Bush could not assure the Turkish leader enough for Ankara to rule out
the military option.
“This crisis was predictable and predicted.
U.S. officials have long known that a Turkish incursion was just one
terrorist event away. As tensions mounted, the administration had
numerous opportunities to engage in preventive diplomacy. A combination
of lack of imagination, incompetence and sheer lack of knowledge at the
State Department has caused this impasse,” Henri J. Barkey wrote in the
Washington Post on October 27.
The New York Times on Oct. 22
reported that “American officials acknowledged that neither the United
States nor Iraq had done much recently to constrain” the P.K.K. Current
and former Bush administration officials said a special envoy appointed
by the Bush administration in 2006, Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, “had
recently stepped down in frustration over Iraqi and American inaction.”
Ahead
of their summit Bush sent his Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to
Ankara and to the meeting of Iraq neighbors in Istanbul with a
“diplomatic” proposal to diffuse the crisis based on hitting at the
heart of the Pan-Kurdish declared loyalties of the Iraqi Kurds’
leaders, Talbani and Barzani, by splitting the Kurds into a terrorist
camp, which Rice declared in Ankara as the “common enemy” of her
country, Turkey and Iraq and a non-terrorist camp which both men
represent.
During their summit on Nov. 5, Bush promised Erdogan
that Turkey would be furnished with U.S. intelligence on the camps and
movements of the P.K.K. The Turkish press reported this as a “green
light for military strikes.” For the U.S., the main issue now is that
“Turkish military action is limited and strictly controlled,” commented
Spiegel on-line. “Where possible,” the publication added, “military
action should be coordinated with the (Iraqi) Kurdish regional
government so as to avoid clashes between the Turkish army and the
northern Iraqi Kurdish militias.”
NATO had earlier expressed its
solidarity with Turkey. On October 24, NATO defense ministers meeting
in The Netherlands said the 26 allies expressed solidarity with Turkey
in the face of the attacks. P.K.K. rebels have killed more than 40
Turks in hit-and-run attacks over the past month. “I think the Turkish
government is showing restraint, remarkable restraint under current
conditions,” NATO chief Hoop Scheffer told a news conference.
But for how long could Turkey practice restrain before her NATO allies translate their so far verbal solidarity into deeds?
Scot
Sullivan, writing in The Conservative Voice on Nov. 9, had a different
interpretation of the results of the Bush-Erdogan summit: “The U.S. is
appeasing Iran and Iran’s P.K.K. allies while preparing to confront
Turkey. Such is the inescapable conclusion following Erdogan-Bush
Summit. A careful assessment of the Erdogan-Bush summit indicates that
Bush remains hostile to Turkey and sympathetic to the P.K.K.-Iran Axis
that seeks to partition Iraq. Bush made only two modest assistance
offers to Turkey. Each offer raised more questions than answers.”
First,
Bush’s offer to share intelligence with Turkey implies that the U.S.
has been withholding such intelligence from Turkey until now despite
U.S. obligations within NATO and despite bilateral counterterrorism
agreements. Second, the establishment of coordinating mechanism between
the U.S. and Turkey for conducting joint operations against the P.K.K.
is in reality “no more than a hotline, or more accurately a US phone
number.”
To add insult to injury, the “U.S. brush-off of Turkey
became evident, according to Sullivan, when “General Petraeus was named
as the U.S. point of contact. For the Turkish military, GEN Petraeus is
pro-Kurdish. He approved without question the P.K.K. military buildup
in northern Iraq. He also approved granting the Kurdish peshmerga the
status of an independent military force that is answerable only to
Kurdish president Barzani.”
Wider Strategic Envelopment of Turkey
Turkey
is a close NATO ally; she contributes troops to NATO's operation in
Afghanistan and provides access to Incirlik air base for heavy U.S.
military logistical support and supply to its forces in Iraq, where
NATO is training the new Iraqi army. However, more importantly Turkey
sits astride the cross roads of the huge oil reserves in the Caspian
and Gulf regions.
The Caspian Sea region is gradually emerging
as one of the most explosive parts of the world and the US and NATO
involvement is linking it inextricably to the already war-torn Middle
East region. This NATO-US involvement is alerting the five Caspian
states - Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – to be
on guard; in the past decade, the number of warships on the Caspian has
almost doubled, while coastal infrastructure is also being rapidly
reinforced, Vasilina Vasilyeva reported in Moscow News on Nov. 8.
On
a wider scale the NATO-U.S. heavy and aggressive involvement in both
regions is strategically invoking defensive responses by Chine and
Russia, which geopolitically consider both regions, but the Caspian in
particular, their backyards; hence their evolving bilateral strategic
coordination as well as their growing closer ties with Iran, the
regional major player targeted by the NATO-U.S. involvement.
“The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization is considering the possibility of
providing security for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline,” Vasilyeva
quoted Robert Simmons, the NATO secretary general's special
representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, as saying. “The
Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline runs to Turkey, a NATO country, and passes
through the territory of Azerbaijan, a NATO partner. The protection of
energy infrastructure includes the security of this oil pipeline in
addition to other energy infrastructure facilities.” NATO has also
finalized a long term program to provide military support for all
pipelines along the Caspian-Turkey-Balkans route. Vasilyeva added that
terrorism is the biggest threat to the pipeline.
On October 16,
Russian President Vladimir Putin told Iranian media in Tehran that
“international terrorism cannot be dealt with by expanding a
military-political organization that was originally set up to
counteract the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. There is no Soviet
Union and no Warsaw Pact today, while NATO not only exists but is
expanding.”
Counterproductive US policies is antagonizing
Turkey, which is indigenously deeply involved in both regions with vast
strategic, economic and political interests, and consequently
threatening to disrupt a successful NATO expansion south, invoking
cracks within the NATO membership, and creating a pragmatic possibility
for potential Turkish strategic shifts.
Under the headline,
“Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,” the July/August edition of the
magazine Foreign Affairs wrote, “a significant shift in the country’s
foreign policy has gone largely unnoticed: after of decades of
passivity, Turkey is now emerging as an important diplomatic actor in
the Middle East.” Within this context Turkey’s pragmatic evolving ties
with Iran and Syria, both condemned by Bush as two pillars of a world’s
“axis of evil,” is an indication.
Similar pragmatic evolution of
ties and coordination with the two major obstacles to NATO’s expansion
south and southeast, namely Russia and China, could not be ruled out
should the United States, the backbone of the alliance, persist with
its political and military insensitivity to the strategic interests of
her allies.
*Nicola Nasser is a veteran Arab journalist in
Kuwait, UAE, Jordan and Palestine; he is based in Bir Zeit, West Bank
of the Israeli-occupied territories.

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