Well, if you buy the nonsense reported in the Washington Post, I have a bridge to sell you. According to Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, the snafu involving missing nukes was just a bad mistake. They write:
A simple error in a missile storage room led to missteps at every turn, as ground crews failed to notice the warheads, and as security teams and flight crew members failed to provide adequate oversight and check the cargo thoroughly. An elaborate nuclear safeguard system, nurtured during the Cold War and infused with rigorous accounting and command procedures, was utterly debased, the investigation’s early results show.
Sorry boys and girls, but that is nonsense. You do not walk into an ammo/weapons bunker and sort thru a bunch a cruise missiles like a college freshman searching their laundry basket in the dark for a pair of matching socks.
Despite the appearance of a meticulous report, Warrick and Pincus leave some enormous holes unfilled. Consider this, for example:
A munitions custodian officer is supposed to keep track of the nuclear warheads. In the case of cruise missiles, a stamp-size window on the missile’s frame allows workers to peer inside to check whether the warheads within are silver. In many cases, a red ribbon or marker attached to the missile serves as an additional warning. Finally, before the missiles are moved, two-man teams are supposed to look at check sheets, bar codes and serial numbers denoting whether the missiles are armed.
Why the warheads were not noticed in this case is not publicly known. But once the missiles were certified as unarmed, a requirement for unique security precautions when nuclear warheads are moved — such as the presence of specially armed security police, the approval of a senior base commander and a special tracking system — evaporated.
So let’s see: not only did the munitions custodian officer lose track of the warheads, but an additional two-man team failed to record the pertinent data, and the pilots did not inspect the weapons. And now we learn that nukes and conventional weapons are stored together willy-nilly?
One main question remains unanswered? Why are such weapons being taken to Barksdale, Louisiana, which is the jump off base for Middle East ops? Just asking.
Going thru my mailbox came across the following from a friend and former B-52 pilot. The pilot’s views inform my observations.
Recently the news media reported a USAF B-52 taking off from Minot AFB,
ND and landing at Barksdale AFB, LA with six nuclear weapons aboard.
The big question is how or why this could happen?
First of all I have to say we are not privileged to all of the
information and may never know the underlying circumstances of this
occurrence. The Department of Defense declared this entire event was a
mistake and would investigate what actually happened.
Obviously there are two possibilities: 1. this was an error and the
events that occurred were a tragic mistake of far reaching proportions;
and 2. the nuclear weapons were moved on purpose.
The United States has had nuclear weapons for over sixty years. Through
out this time the tracking, storage and movement of these weapons has
been performed without any type of security problem. The chain of
custody procedures has been refined to the nith degree to insure that
there will never be a mistake. The access to, movement of, and custody
of these weapons is so tightly controlled, each serial numbered weapon
has to be signed for when possession of it changes (from one person to
another), then only after receiving a lawful order to do so. In order
to load a nuclear weapon onto an aircraft the Weapon’s Depot Commander
must receive a lawful order from above. The order is sent down (in
writing) to one of the bomb shelter custodians and the weapon is signed
out to a Loader. The Loader, loads the weapon onto an aircraft and will
keep the weapon/aircraft under surveillance with the aircraft under
armed guard by the Security Police in an isolated protected area until
the Aircraft Commander performs his pre-flight inspection on the
aircraft and signs a receipt for each of the weapons by serial number.
Once delivered at their destination the Aircraft Commander would
receive a receipt for the weapons by serial number from the receiving
facility.
With all of the necessary orders and paperwork required just to move a
nuclear weapon from one room in a storage facility to another, it can
be stated with some sort of certainty that this was not a casual
mistake as the Department of Defense has eluted to.
Then if the movement wasn’t a mistake, it obviously was done with some sort of purpose in mind.
The destination of the aircraft was Barksdale AFB, LA from which a
number of the strikes on the Middle East have initiated. Speculation
would lead us to believe the weapons were being stockpiled at this
facility for a possible strike somewhere in the world. Additional
speculation would also lead us to believe the strike was to occur in
the very near future. Why else the need to forego the normal overland
transportation procedures for nuclear weapons and risk flying them to
their destination in violation of a treaty with the Russians. Also how
is it the press was aware of this movement? After all who would be
suspicious of a B-52 taking off from a B-52 base and a B-52 landing at
a B-52 base. This event goes on many times each day for practice
missions and training. Some one had to have leaked the information to
the press that the U.S. was moving nuclear weapons by air in a treaty
violation.
This leads us to two possible scenarios.
1. Whoever leaked the information would have been someone in a position
of authority knowing what was going on and concerned the U.S. was
actually attempting to use nuclear weapons somewhere in the world and
wanting to stop it by exposing it. This someone would have had to have
a security clearance of some kind and violated the trust under which it
was issued thus being exposed to severe penalties and jail time for
potential treason etc. Facing such severe penalties someone would have
to be totally committed to his/her own conscience/moral beliefs. This
preemptive exposure would put the U.S. on a difficult footing and loss
of the surprise factor, thus potentially curtailing the mission.
2. The other possibility would be the information on the flight was
leaked on purpose in an attempt to influence a foreign government,
group or situation to move in a particular direction. That the U.S. was
“Saber rattling” and the stakes were high enough to risk antagonizing
the Russians to accomplish it. (With the possibility the Russians were
supporting the action and willing to overlook the violation as
exemplified by their lack of response in the entire situation.)
In either case we have only seen some minor actions taking by the
Department of Defense in an attempt to say; well, by accident we left a
few nuc’s laying around on some missiles we were going to destroy and
they accidentally got loaded onto a plane that by some coincidence
happened to be going to a base other than the one it was assigned to
(we rarely fly B-52’s assigned at one station to another station).
B-52’s usually take off from their home base, fly their mission
anywhere in the world by aerial refueling and then return to the base
from which they departed. Often these flights take over 20 to 30 hours.
If this was a mistake what is happening to the general officers in the
chain of command who would have had to issue lawful orders for the
movement of those weapons and all those in the custodial chain who
would have had to sign for each weapon as they gained possession of
them? It just doesn’t add up. Especially when there is a line item in
the budget before Congress to upgrade the missiles the Air Force says
they were about to destroy. There appears to be too many loose ends
still dangling. In addition to all of this did anyone notice how
quickly this entire situation quieted down. Usually the press would
play on such a world shaking event for months. They do for other things
like the first birthday of Anna Nicole’s daughter. We’ve heard about
that for weeks on end. But, for a world event with treaty violation
implications, no protests from the other treaty signers or other major
world players, we get about three days of news attention and it goes
away. It seems the exposure has played its roles and has gone away with
hopes all is forgotten.
In closing, again we are not privileged in knowing all of the facts and
undercover goings on in this matter to be fully aware of what the real
intent of this action, but it appears to be more than what the surface
information appears.
All those who run and visit websites—and this means all of us—need to be concerned about this development for it threatens our very existence. Usmanov has the bread to pay high-powered lawyers to threaten our right to access the means of communication and who can afford to take on multi-millionaires?
I think it’s about time we had some kind of organisation that we could give some collective clout to that could start to campaign for some legal protection against louts like Usmanov let alone the state.
(And this is guy who wants to buy the ‘Gunners’, the Arsenal Football Club based in North London!)
Addendum: There is this Committee to Protect Bloggers but I don’t know much about them or whether they can protect us. They have a forum where I posted this short note. http://committeetoprotectbloggers.org/
Bill
1
September 24, 2007
a guest: ...
There is no way in hell that this was an accident. I work at a civilian nuclear plantand have experience with the accounting of nuclear material, so I can only imagine the absolutely unconditional rigor that would be applied to controlling the inventory and movement of nuclear arms. There are only three plausible explanations for this event in my mind:
1-This is psychological warfare. The “leak” was intentional and intended to scare the sh*t out of Iran and everybody else, to make it look like the US is gearing up for a nuclear strike on Iran (in step with the propaganda campaign that has recently been stepped up by our friends at Fox, CNN and the rest). This assumes that the powers responsible do not really want to attack Iran (though they still may “have to”), but need to promote the perception that they will in order to gain leverage on the diplomatic side.
2-This is psychological warfare. The “leak” was intentional and intended to soften up the public, planting the idea that nuclear weapons inside the US are not as secure as they should be. In this way, if (God forbid) a “terrorist” detonates one of these devices inside the US (as the next 9/11), there will be already be an event on record that they can point to as evidence that it would be possible for a “terrorist” to obtain a US nuke. I know this sounds insane but there are dozens of very high-ranking people in the US who have made reference to this exact scenario (except they do not tell us that the “terrorists” would be intelligence assets/agents).
3-The leak was from somebody with a conscience inside the military who believes that the US is gearing up for a nuclear attack on Iran. This person decided that they would rather blow the whistle (and risk the consequences) than sit back and be a good little German and do what they were told.
My guess is #1, but all 3 are entirely plausible (unlike the explanation offered by the Washington Post) and not mutually exclusive.
At this point it is completely irrational and unwise to believe any explanation given by the corporate presstitutes (“journalists” for hire).
“During times of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act.” – George Orwell
2
September 24, 2007
a guest: Robert McNamara's Book, 'BLUNDERING INTO DISASTER'
Robert explains in his book how fragile the situation is as a country aquires it's first nuke. Just one or two provokes pre-emptive strikes. Now half a dozen put's you in the M.A.D. club. Nobody will touch you. So when we hear denials from whoever, that Iran has NOT received six nukes to even up the brinkmanship, then we might ponder Otto Von Bismark's famous quip:- "Never believe anything in politics untill it has been officially denied"
3
September 26, 2007
a guest: ...
I find fault in Larry C. Johnson’s take on the storage, breakout, transport, loading, and securing of nuclear weapons, which brings into question the entire content of the article. When he said "You do not walk into an ammo/weapons bunker and sort thru a bunch a cruise missiles...” he’s actually dead on in that description. When a transport crew shows up to haul the weapons away they hope desperately that the storage crew left the missiles they need at the front of the building, otherwise they have to shuffle huge weapons packages around.
He then said “And now we learn that nukes and conventional weapons are stored together willy-nilly?” that’s not a true statement and he didn’t even show any evidence where that could be inferred. A cruise missile without a nuclear warhead is not a conventional weapon – it’s a cruise missile without a nuclear warhead. And yes they’re stored in the same shelters as other cruise missiles for physical reasons - they’re big and heavy and not a lot of buildings on earth can house them.
To help out, a Munitions Custodian officer “owns” the munitions. At worst he/she is a glorified paper pusher. The Munitions Custodian officer does not go out and check the status of each weapon when ever its status changes, that’s delegated to responsible officers and NCOs although the custodian is held responsible for those individuals who let him down.
Also, the pilot who gave Larry such wonderful information was glaringly wrong with the statement “The United States has had nuclear weapons for over sixty years. Through out this time the tracking, storage and movement of these weapons has been performed without any type of security problem.” Hardly. People aren’t perfect and multiple incidents have happened in the history of the Air Force and Navy. As a pilot this person should know that we’ve left nukes scattered over Greenland and Spain, proving a huge storage and security nightmare.
In the end the whole incident is situation in full FUBAR status. I’ve been in the munitions field for over 20 years and there’s one glaring item that proves this is nothing but a screw up: When the situation came to light the first thing they did was decertify the load crew. If this was some fantastical ‘saber rattling’ that never would have happened, certified load crews are too valuable to the operation of a bomber squadron. And if this was leaked for any nefarious purpose it was the same old one – to make the current administration look bad.
4
September 26, 2007
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