The U.S. and Israeli officials have been repeatedly on record
to pre-condition the convening of the proposed conference and their
support to Abbas on sustaining his outbreak with Hamas. A hint by the
Italian Premier Romano Prodi about having a dialogue with Hamas and an
outright call for such a dialogue by the British House of Common's
Foreign Affairs Committee in August drew sharp criticism from Livni as
a “huge mistake” that “will only cripple the process of reconciliation
and will halt the current positive momentum,” according to Foreign
Ministry spokesman Mark Regev.
Israel has ruled out Abbas as a
peace partner since his election in January 2005; the U.S. has done
nothing essential to make the Israelis reconsider. It was left to Hamas
to convince both sides to come to their political senses. The Islamic
movement’s landslide electoral victory in January 2006 and control of
the Gaza Strip in mid June this year have only prodded them to
reconsider tactically how to keep Abbas in place lest a similar
scenario carries Hamas close to Israeli door steps in the West Bank.
The PA is overreacting in their anti-Hamas measures to assure that the
new diplomatic momentum continues; the majority leader in the
Democratic-led U.S. House of Representatives Steny Hoyer emerged from a
meeting with Palestinian premier Salam Fayyad in Ramallah on August 14
to tell reporters: “Mr. Fayyad made very clear that Hamas could not and
would not be a partner in moving forward.” Abbas and Fayyad are
resisting huge Palestinian, Arab and Muslim pressure to sustain their
rejection of dialogue with Hamas, which is also demanded by Russia,
Norway, India and the Non-Aligned Movement; they have so far aborted at
least eight mediation efforts to restore Palestinian unity, which was
also recommended by the International Crisis Group (ICG) early in
August.
The U.S. sponsors of the upcoming conference are not
leaving prospects to good faith and hopeful wishes; the success for the
U.S. Administration is judged by convening the conference and not by
any results it may yield because the White House and the State
department planned it as a public relations event on the one hand and
as a “banana” to bring in Arab heavy weights like Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates to meet face to face with Israel, in a public show
of Arab normalization with Israeli officials, allegedly to boost
Olmert’s fragile political standing at home to encourage him to take
the next step towards peace.
Bush is urging Olmert to make
“concessions” to Abbas to avert a Hamas takeover in the West Bank.
Reportedly, Olmert is now forthcoming to cooperate with Abbas in
writing something like a “framework agreement” that will lay down the
principles of an agreement that may be achieved later on, but without
details or a time-table or guarantees, which is a non-starter for a
breakthrough. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak's expectation of a
possible early election next year and his recent assertion that Israel
would not be ready to make a large-scale pullback from the West Bank
for at least 2 1/2 years raise more doubts than assurances.
After meeting with Olmert in the West Bank town of Jericho in August,
the two men met again in Jerusalem later in the month, met for a third
time also in Jerusalem on Tuesday and said they will be meeting again
this September before another encounter during a Palestinian – Israeli
business conference in Tel Aviv in October, where they will meet also
with the special envoy of the Quartet of the U.S., U.N., EU and Russia,
Tony Blair. Between September 16–19 both men will receive the visiting
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice; her Assistant for Near
Eastern Affairs, David Welch, paid both men a visit ahead of Rice's
planned visit. Later in September Abbas will head for New York.
Two-pronged Effort
The Americans are now leading a two-pronged effort to strengthen Abbas
- the Washington conference is planned to present the “political
horizon,” while Quartet envoy Tony Blair — who arrived in the region
last week for a ten-day visit but hardly a word was heard from him —
and U.S. Security Coordinator Keith Dayton are working to rehabilitate
and bolster the PA’s security and civilian institutions in the West
Bank. Visits by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Aso, EU foreign
policy chief Javier Solana, Italian top diplomat Massimo D'Alema,
Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer and French Foreign Minister,
Bernard Kouchner were perceived as contributing to Blair’s and Dayton’s
mission. The European Union's foreign ministers meeting last week for
two days in Portugal, which currently holds the EU's rotating
presidency, discussed measures to make their mission a success.
Israeli daily Haaretz on September 12 reported the United States will
host the conference in Washington, D.C., in November, the week before
Thanksgiving. Rice will chair the meeting, which “will seek to win
support for arrangements being drafted” by Olmert and Abbas “but will
not have any negotiating role” the daily said, adding that Rice and her
Israeli counterpart, Tzipi Livni, initiated the “political horizon” or
“shelf agreement” whose implementation will be put off until the
Palestinian Authority (PA) is strong enough to carry out. Olmert agreed
to the plan. U.S. and Israeli officials seem faithful to a sixty-year
old strategy of managing the conflict. Recently they seem to have taken
the advice of an old hand in this strategy like the veteran U.S. peace
negotiator Dennis Ross, who wrote in The New Republic on July 16:
“There does need to be a sense of possibility about peace with Israel.
A process, negotiations, dialogue, and the promise of changes on the
ground will count for a lot. Ironically, I did not find the
Palestinians I spoke with — and the number is now over 40 in my two
visits here in the last six weeks — wanting to raise false
expectations. No one expects an immediate breakthrough and resolution
of the permanent status issues.”
“Over the years, the
Palestinians have learned that for Israelis, nothing is more permanent
than the temporary,” Akiva Eldar wrote in Haaretz on August 24. In
their effort to find a formula for bridging the temporary and the
permanent, Olmert and Vice Premier Haim Ramon have adopted the method
of “constructive ambiguity,” which allows each side to have its own
interpretation. In the case of temporary borders, the compromise
formula is expected to stipulate temporary borders in the first stage,
but with no declaration of statehood until there is an agreement on
final borders. The United Nations and the Vatican voiced optimistic
hope that the fall conference could yet deliver a long – awaited
revival of the peace process. The conference raised new hopes and
created a “particularly favorable context” for progress in the “crisis
that has lasted 60 years and that continues to spread grief and
destruction,” a Vatican statement said on September 6. The U.N.'s top
Middle East envoy, Michael Williams, added a warning against failure to
hopeful prospects: “There is a hope now which has been absent for
almost seven years. A setback at this stage could have serious
consequences,” Williams told the Security Council recently; he cited
among the “signs of hope” the proposed conference, the revival of a
pan-Arab peace initiative, “and, perhaps above all,” the dialogue
between Abbas and Olmert.
Ruling out Syria, Hamas Non-starter
Palestinian, Arab, Muslim and international critical analysts question
Bush’s proposal as a public relations ploy that aims at luring moderate
Arab governments into a U.S. – led political, diplomatic and, probably
later, a military Arab – Israeli camp of moderates to serve the U.S.
strategy against what he had earlier termed as an Iranian – Syrian
“axis of evil” and to help save whatever could be saved for Americans
in Iraq should the anti-war escalating campaign inside the United
States force him to consider an exit strategy. Critics highlight the
fact that Bush’s proposed gathering is increasingly sowing divisive
discord both among Arabs and Palestinians.
On the official
level, during a regular Arab League (AL) meeting held recently in
Cairo, Arabs said the U.S. initiative must be dealt with cautiously. AL
Secretary General Amr Moussa said that the conference, if fails, would
pose a threat to Arab interests and regional stability. Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak warned that if the conference fails to produce
a breakthrough, the negative repercussions would affect the whole
region, increase feelings of frustration and strengthen extremism.
Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abul Gheit, on September 12 said it
was imperative to set an agenda for the conference to clarify the goals
and participants, the foreign ministry said in a statement. Jordan's
King Abdullah II, who early this month toured France, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and the United Arab Emirates in efforts to energize the peace
process, said after meeting with Blair in Amman on September 9 the
conference should lay out a working plan with a “specific timetable.”
Arabs and Abbas are demanding that Syria be invited to secure the
success of the conference, but not Hamas.
All those involved in
the current diplomatic flurry recognize Abbas as the legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people and all rule out dealing with
the Hamas rulers of the Gaza Strip. How then will any agreement signed
with Abbas be accepted by Hamas as well? For example how can they, and
Abbas, begin handling the rocket and mortar shell fire directed at
Israeli targets from Gaza, like the one that hit the southern Israeli
military base of Zikim on Tuesday and wounded at least fifty soldiers?
Or with whom they are to negotiate the release of the Israeli soldier
Gilad Schalit from his Palestinian captivity in Gaza?
Ruling
Syria or Hamas is a non-starter; ruling both out only casts doubts on
the sponsors’ real goals; do they intend to prove later that Abbas
could not deliver and consequently is not qualified as a partner as an
excuse to absolve themselves of commitments they might take upon
themselves during the upcoming conference?
Abbas, Olmert Don’t See Eye to Eye
Judging by Abbas – Olmert meetings, despite the reports that the two
sides had agreed to set up negotiating teams to advance their talks,
neither side issued a statement, announced any breakthroughs, had
anything in writing or reported a tangible progress, but both sides
confirmed they did not address any details of the final status issues.
Chief Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erakat, denied any exchange of memos
of understanding. Ynet had quoted a senior political source in Olmert’s
Office as saying, “at this point no agreement has been reached” and
made it clear that “it is too soon to tell if such an agreement would
find its way to the proposed conference,” probably in Washington.
However Abbas and Olmert still do not see eye to eye to what their
dialogue should deliver to secure the success of the proposed
conference. Abbas demands they should reach a “framework agreement” for
a “declaration of principles” with a timeline and mechanisms for
implementation on the final status issue, including the core issues of
borders, Jerusalem and the fate of Palestinian refugees, ahead of the
conference. “A genuine project for peace should be presented to this
conference so it can serve as a basis for negotiations and reach
towards a final settlement,” Abbas told reporters in the West Bank city
of Ramallah last week. “We are concerned that November 15 will come —
if this will indeed be the date for this international conference —
without arriving at a specific agreement on all the issues,” then “this
meeting will be described as a failure. We do not want a meeting that
results in merely a statement. We do not want a meeting that will end
up a failure for everybody.”
But Olmert seeks agreement on a
broadbrush “declaration of principles” that would be a general
statement of intent rather than a concrete diplomatic commitment. On
August 3 Olmert said even he was not sure he would be able to reach a
deal with Abbas on statehood principles ahead of the November
international meeting. “I have been holding meetings with Abu Mazen
(Abbas) and I hope that in the near future this will lead to a ...
joint declaration. If we can achieve a draft by November, we will
achieve it, but I am not sure we will be able to do that,” he told
reporters. His government’s spokesperson, Mir Eisen, said: “We think
that the Palestinian Authority needs to build itself, its government,
its security forces, before we define this state.”
Earlier,
Abbas had said the proposed conference would be a “waste of time” if it
focused solely on a “declaration of principles.” He even hinted
indirectly to boycotting the event: “If there is a clear framework
including final status issues, we will welcome this and go to the
[November] conference,” he added. Reportedly, Olmert is now forthcoming
to cooperate with Abbas in writing something like a one-page “framework
agreement” that will lay down the principles of an agreement that may
be achieved later on, but without details or a time-table or guarantees
for implementation, which is a non-starter for a breakthrough.
“I am really terrified that these meetings and the meeting in November
... will create the illusion with a certain part of our publics, on
both sides, that peace is possible and both leaders are capable,” Nazmi
Al-Jubeh, a Bir Zeit University professor and one of the Palestinian
negotiators on the Geneva Accord, told The Globe and Mail on August 29,
warning the collapse of such an illusion “will lead us into another
kind of
intifada.”
In an interview with the
“Palestine-Israel Journal” (Vol.14 No.2 2007), former PA security
adviser, Jibril al-Rajoub, responded to U.S. President George W. Bush’s
call for an international peace conference: “The Palestinian people are
fed up with good will statements we have been hearing them for years
now. We are looking to see something moving on the ground. We are
looking for practical mechanisms to start implementing the Road Map and
the Bush vision, and international legitimacy.” On the appointment of
Tony Blair as the Quartet envoy, he said: “as far as I know, his
mandate has nothing to do with politics.”
Many Israelis are
skeptical as well. “The Bush initiative is a basic strategic pitfall,
premised on driving a wedge between Mahmoud Abbas' “moderates” and
Hamas' “extremists,” former Israeli foreign minister, Shlomo Ben Ami,
wrote in ynetnews.com on August 17. In an article titled, “Saving
President Abbas,” Israeli leader of Gush Shalom wrote on June 23: “At
present, all Olmert's actions are endangering Abbas. His embrace is a
bear's embrace, and his kiss is the kiss of death… If I might offer
some advice to Abbas, I would call out to him: Run! Run for your
precious life! One touch of Olmert's hand will seal your fate!” But
Abbas has been embracing Olmert on a biweekly basis for almost six
months now!?
Nicola Nasser is a veteran Arab journalist in
Kuwait, Jordan, UAE and Palestine; he is based in Bir Zeit, West Bank
of the Israeli-occupied territories.