On
a November 9, 2006, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-Peoples Army,
(FARC-EP) sent an “Open Letter to the People of the United States”. It was specifically addressed to several
Hollywood producers and actors (Michael Moore, Denzel Washington and Oliver
Stone) as well as three leftist academics (James Petras, Noam Chomsky and
Angela Davis) and a progressive politician (Jessie Jackson). The purpose of the open letter was to solicit
our support in facilitating an agreement between the US and Colombian
governments and the FARC-EP on exchanging 600 imprisoned guerrillas (including
2 on trial in the US) for 60 rebel-held prisoners including 3 US counter-insurgency
experts.
FARC-EP: Terrorist Band or Resistance Movement?
Contrary
to the US government position characterizing the FARC-EP as a ‘terrorist
organization’, it is the longest standing, largest peasant-based guerrilla
movement in the world today. Founded in
1964 by two dozen peasant activists, as a means for defending autonomous rural
communities from the violent depredations of the Colombian military and
paramilitary, the FARC-EP has grown into a highly organized 20,000 member
guerrilla army with several hundred thousand local militia and supporters,
highly influential in over 40% of the country.
Up until September 11, 2001, the FARC-EP was recognized as a legitimate
resistance movement by most of the countries of the European Union, Latin
America and for several years was in peace negotiations with the Colombian
government headed by President Andrés Pastrana.
Prior to 9/11 FARC leaders met with European heads of state to exchange
ideas on the peace process. Numerous
prominent business leaders from Wall Street, City of London and Bogotá and
notables like Queen Noor of Jordan met with FARC leaders in the demilitarized
zone during the aborted peace negotiations (1999-2002).
Under
heavy pressure from the White House, particularly its leading spokespersons,
the right-wing extremists like the notorious Otto Reich, Roger Noriega and,
John Bolton, the Pastrana regime abruptly broke off negotiations and in less
than 24 hours sent the Colombian Army into the demilitarized area, in an
attempt to capture the FARC leaders engaged in negotiations. The ‘surprise’ attack failed but did set the
stage for the escalation of the conflict.
US Role in Conflict
Beginning
with President Clinton in 2000 and continuing with Bush, the US has poured over
$4 Billion dollars in military aid to the Colombian regime in order to destroy
the guerrilla army and its suspected social base among peasants, urban trade
unions and professionals (especially teachers, lawyers, human rights activists
and intellectuals). Washington vigorously pushes a military solution by
subverting any peace negotiations, through a substantial number of military
advisers, contracted mercenaries, Drug Enforcement operatives, CIA agents,
Special Forces commandos and a host of other undercover personnel. Between the early 1980’s to the late 1990’s,
Washington maintained the fiction that its military programs were part of an
anti-narcotic campaign, though it failed to explain why it concentrated most of
its efforts in FARC-influenced regions and not in the vast coca-growing areas
controlled by the Colombian military and paramilitary forces. With the launching of Plan Colombia in 2000,
Washington explicitly underlined the counter-insurgency nature of its military
aid and presence. Profoundly disturbed
by President Pastana’s acceptance of peace negotiations and the advances of the
social and guerrilla movements, Washington backed a rightwing politician with a
history of ties to Colombia’s death squads for President, Álvaro Uribe. His electoral victory inaugurated one of the
bloodiest extermination campaigns in the violent history of Colombia.
US
military officials and their Colombian counterparts funded a 31,000 strong
death squad force which ravaged the country, killing thousands of peasants in
regions where the FARC was influential.
Hundreds of trade unionists were assassinated by hired killers (sicarios)
in broad daylight in the towns and cities occupied by the military. Human rights workers, journalists and
academics who dared to report on the impunity of the military involved in
village massacres were kidnapped, tortured and killed; not infrequently they
were decapitated or disemboweled to sow even greater terror. Over 2 million peasants were forced off their
land into squalid urban slums, their lands seized by prominent paramilitary
chiefs or large landowners. The ‘class
cleansing’ of the countryside was right out of the counter-insurgency manuals
of the Pentagon, instructing the Colombian military to destroy the ‘social
infrastructure’ of the guerrilla movements – especially the FARC which had
longstanding and extensive family, community and social ties with the peasants.
President
Uribe embodied the classical authoritarian South American ruler: At the throat
of the poor and on his knees before his Washington patron. His perpetual large-scale offensive campaigns
decimated the countryside but failed to weaken the guerrillas or even capture
any of the FARC general command. After
six years of massive and costly extermination campaigns, top US and most Colombian
military officials conceded that a military victory over the FARC was highly
improbable. The best that could ensue,
military strategists argued, was a severe weakening of the FARC, forcing them
to negotiate a ‘peace agreement’ favorable to the regime.
Peace Negotiations: A Brief History
During
the Presidency of Belisario Betancourt (in the mid 1980’s), the FARC agreed to
a cease-fire and many joined the electoral process. Thousands of guerrillas, their sympathizers
and many independent leftists formed a political party, the Patriotic Union
(Unión Patriótica) and ran candidates at all levels of government. In less than 5 years, 5000 activists,
candidates and elected officials were murdered by the military and their death
squads, including two presidential candidates, several congresspeople, scores
of mayors, hundreds of city councilors and local party leaders. The survivors rejoined the guerrillas, fled
into exile or went underground. Contrary
to claims by the government, Colombia was not a ‘democracy’ in the usual sense,
but a ‘death squad democracy’ in which the most elementary conditions for
electoral campaigning and political norms were absent. Less than two decades later, when the FARC
had extended its influence within 40 miles from the capital Bogotá, the
government of Andrés Pastrana agreed to another round of ‘peace negotiations’
in an extensive demilitarized region under FARC influence.
While
the negotiations proceeded, hundreds of ‘visitors’ from all sectors of
Colombian society as well as foreign political and business notables
participated in public forums. Open
debates organized by the FARC covered fundamental social, economic and
political issues. For the first time in
recent memory, issues of land reform, public investment in job creation
programs, foreign investment and public ownership, economic alternatives to
coca farming, education and health were debated without fear of death squad
reprisals. The image of the FARC as a
‘militarist narco-guerrilla force’ was challenged; many former hostile
observers from Europe, Latin America and North America, while not necessarily
agreeing with some of the FARC’s proposed reforms, nevertheless came away with
the impression that they could be negotiated with and agreements could be
reached to end the civil war.
The
radicalization of the Bush regime following September 11, 2001 served as a
pretext to force a break in the peace negotiations. Subsequently with the election of Álvaro
Uribe, the FARC was included in the list of ‘terrorist’ organizations. The European Union, which had publicly met
and consulted with the same FARC leaders, followed the US lead. Soon afterward, FARC negotiators and
international representatives were arrested in Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela and
Ecuador. The latter two countries handed
FARC representatives over to the notoriously brutal Colombian political police
(DAS). Under cover of Washington’s ‘War
on Terrorism’, President Uribe proceeded to severely repress trade union general
strikes and massive rural protests by the major agricultural organizations
against his signing of a ‘free trade’ agreement with the US.
In
the midst of government-sponsored carnage, the FARC pursued a strategy of
tactical withdrawal to its jungle and mountain strongholds and issued offers
for mutual prisoner release as a ‘confidence building’ step toward future peace
negotiations.
The
FARC held over 60 Colombian politicians and military officers prisoner,
including a former presidential candidate, Ingrid Betancourt and three US
self-described ‘military contractors’ engaged in an intelligence collecting
mission. The Colombian government holds
over 600 guerrillas. The US currently
holds 2 FARC members. The FARC proposed
a meeting to arrange a prisoner exchange in a demilitarized zone. The families of the FARC prisoners were
naturally unanimously in favor of the proposal as were most civil society
organizations, humanitarian, church and human rights groups. The US has opposed any prisoner exchange and
Uribe echoed his master, at least during his first term of office. Their slogan was that through military action
they would liberate the prisoners. No
prisoners have been ‘liberated’ in the past five years. On the contrary in a recent failed military
incursion, 10 prisoners were killed, including an ex-minister of defense, a
governor and 8 military officers. Under
enormous pressure from Colombian civil society, the European Union and most
Latin American governments, President Uribe declared, on his re-election, that
he would be willing to enter negotiations for an exchange. Within a month, however, he reneged using as
a pretext a bomb set off in a military installation, which he attributed to the
FARC despite its denials. Experts
suspect this was a covert operation by Colombia’s secret service to undermine
any move toward a prisoner exchange.
Prospects for Peace Negotiations
Outside
of Washington and President Uribe’s immediate entourage, everyone agrees that
the beginning of any peace process should begin with confidence building measures,
specifically the prisoner exchange.
Immediately
complicating those negotiations, the US extradited two FARC prisoners held by
the Colombian government on December 31, 2004 and has confined them to solitary
confinement, shackled 23 hours a day. On
October 16, 2006, one of the FARC political prisoners, Ricardo Palmera – whose
better known ‘nom de guerre’ is Simon Trinidad – was put on trial for ‘drug
trafficking’ and ‘terrorism’ as well as ‘kidnapping’. This is a classic ‘political show trial’ in
which an illegal seizure, fabricated evidence and prejudicial judicial
procedures have been mounted to secure a guilty verdict.
The
most suspicious aspect of this political charade is the characterization of
Trinidad’s role in the FARC. He was
their principal peace negotiator, as was evident when he was recognized as the
FARC’s principal interlocutor with Colombian President Andrés Pastrana during
the peace negotiations of 1999-2002.
There are numerous photographs, news reports and interviews in the
Colombian and European media of the time clearly identifying Trinidad as a key
peace negotiator. Equally important,
Trinidad was the principal FARC peace intermediary dealing with United Nations
Human Rights representative, James Lemoyne, appointed by the US Government and
a former New York Times journalist based in Latin America.
Recognizing
that Trinidad’s status as a FARC peace negotiator concerned mainly with
diplomatic missions severely compromised Washington’s case, the Federal
prosecutor modified the charges from direct involvement in the ‘kidnapping’ of
three US counter-insurgency officers held as prisoners of war by the FARC, to
‘association’ with kidnappers and ‘conspiracy’ to commit the crime of ‘hostage
taking’. The Federal prosecutor has
taken advantage of the language of the new anti-terrorism legislation passed by
Presidents Clinton and Bush to indict Trinidad.
This legal framework has been denounced by all leading US civil
liberties organizations and the American Bar Association as violating the US
Constitution.
The
charge of ‘association’ is based on the unsubstantiated charges that Trinidad
‘met’ with the three US counter-insurgency officers, subsequent to their
capture, an accusation which lacks any concrete proof – the Prosecution has
neither witnesses nor documents of such a meeting, not does it specify time,
date or place of the alleged meeting. In
fact, Trinidad was in another province directing a FARC educational program at
the time. The charge of ‘conspiracy’ is
based on Trinidad’s membership in the FARC, which was labeled a ‘terrorist
organization’ by President Clinton in 1997, a characterization which was
rejected by the European Union which played host to a touring group of FARC
leaders and peace negotiators shortly thereafter. Moreover Colombian President Pastrana, who
was engaged in peace negotiations with the FARC between 1999-2002, rejected the
‘terrorist label’ considering Trinidad a legitimate interlocutor.
The
long political history of the FARC, its historic ties with a large segment of
the Colombian countryside, its political program of social reforms, its
targeted use of force in its conflict with the armed forces of the Colombian
state, its continued pursuit of peace negotiations based on reforming society
and the military are in strong opposition to any and all definitions of a
‘terrorist’ organization.
The
entire notion of ‘kidnapping’ three US intelligence or military personnel
engaged in a military surveillance operation in a combat area against an
insurgency targeted by the US is absurd.
As captured combatants, they are, by the definition of the Geneva
Conventions, prisoners of war and, as such, subject to possible prisoner of war
exchanges if the warring parties should agree.
The Federal Prosecutor charged that Trinidad was engaged in the prisoner
exchange when he was illegally seized in Ecuador and transferred to Colombia
and later extradited to the US. In court
Trinidad rebutted that allegation by demonstrating that he was in Ecuador to
set up a meeting between Lemoyne and a top guerrilla leader. The prosecution presented no written or taped
evidence linking Trinidad to any ‘prisoner exchange’.
The Illegal Seizure and Arrest of Simon Trinidad
Any
juridical process worthy of its name would throw out the prosecution’s case on
the most elementary basis of wrongful arrest.
In late December 2003 Trinidad traveled to Quito, Ecuador to contact
James Lemoyne about possible peace negotiations with the Colombian government,
beginning with confidence building, humanitarian measures related to prisoners
and captives. During the earlier peace negotiation Lemoyne had been a decent
peace mediator, rejecting pressure from the US Embassy to scuttle the
proceedings. Given the massive military escalation
undertaken by President Uribe, there was no opportunity for Trinidad to meet
with Lemoyne in Colombia. Word reached
the FARC that Lemoyne would be available for conversations in Quito.
Under
CIA direction, a joint Colombian-Ecuadorian squad illegally seized
Trinidad. The entire operation violated
Ecuadorian sovereignty, judicial procedures and the rights of political
appeal. Extra-territorial seizures of
opposition leaders and their transfer to imperial courts resemble the practices
of the Roman Empire and not contemporary international law.
While
in captivity, Trinidad has been denied access to translations, documents and
writing materials. He was manacled in an
isolation cell for 23 hours a day for over 21 months without access to legal
counsel. The Federal Judge, Thomas
Hogan, and Federal Prosecutor have acted to prejudice the trial even before its
start. Over 30 armed police in a caravan
of police vehicles accompanied by helicopters bring the chained Trinidad to
court. He has been denied any selection
of attorney and assigned a team of
court-appointed lawyers. When his
attorneys attempted to provide a relevant historical context including the
FARC’s attempts to participate in electoral politics and the subsequent
massacre of 5000 activists and candidates, including 2 presidential candidates,
the Prosecution objected. The
Prosecution also objected to the defense’s description of the massive,
sustained State violence in Colombia and the role of the US counterinsurgency
forces in alliance with the paramilitary groups.
In
this Kafkaesque nightmare of a courtroom, the judge was asked by the Prosecutor
to withhold the names of the jurors to protect them from ‘retaliation from
Trinidad’s ‘terrorist organization’ (deep in the Colombian jungle) – further
prejudicing an already frightened jury and biased judge.
The
court-appointed defense attorneys have failed to challenge the most elementary
prejudicial statements by the Prosecution’s key witness, a Colombian Army
Colonel, who referred to Trinidad as a ‘terrorist’ despite the obvious fact
that he has yet to be convicted. Judge
Hogan has refused to allow jurors to take their notebooks containing trial
notes from the court and denied them access to transcripts, preventing them
from rationally evaluating the evidence.
Trinidad’s
refutation of the Prosecutor’s chief Colombian witness and the outrageous
nature of this political show trial were evident from the first day the jury
reported to the judge. The jury declared
that they were deeply divided on all charges and asked the court to declare a
mistrial. After 18 days of highly
charged prosecution, demagogy and inflammatory political rhetoric, the jurors
spent a little over seven hours deliberating before reporting that they were
deadlocked. A note from the jurors to US
District Judge Thomas Hogan stated: “We believe our differences based on deep
thought are irresolvable.” Judge Hogan
rejected Trinidad’s request for a mistrial and told the jurors to keep
deliberating, stating he would declare a mistrial if the jurors repeated their
declaration of a deadlock a second time.
Conclusion
The
‘political show trial’ of Simon Trinidad is a striking example of the threats
to constitutional freedoms, which we and the citizens of the world face before
the unbridled power of the American President to overrule all the rights of
sovereign states and their citizens, international law and constitutional
freedoms.
Equally
important is the current reality of ‘extraterritorial, lawless seizures,
abductions and kangaroo proceedings at the service of bloody imperial policies
and client rulers whose actions have devastated Colombian society. More than 2.5 million Colombian peasants and
urban slum dwellers have been displaced by the savage counter-insurgency
program called ‘Plan Colombia; the number of displaced persons is second only
to Afghanistan. The counterinsurgency
programs, variously called ‘Plan Colombia’, ‘Plan Patriótica’ and ‘Democratic
Security’ are financed and directed by the United States and promoted by its
client President Álvaro Uribe. The US
AFL-CIO documents over 4,000 trade unionists assassinated between 1986-2002;
the Colombian government has only investigated 376 of which only 5 cases led to
a conviction of the killer. According to
Colombian human rights groups, between 2003-2006 Uribe’s military and
paramilitary allies have murdered nearly a thousand more trade unionists. Over the past 5 years, 30,000 peasants, rural
teachers, and peasant and indigenous leaders have been killed with impunity.
State repression (‘Democratic Security’) has
been directed at weakening trade union resistance to the US-Colombian Free
Trade Agreement, not at countering guerrilla armies. With over 68% of the Colombian people living
under the poverty line of $2 dollars a day, and land seizures by paramilitary
leaders, cattle barons and military officers concentrating land ownership to an
unprecedented level, it is no wonder that the guerrilla resistance is
recruiting and successfully countering Government-sponsored military campaigns,
each bearing a triumphalist title and all ending in abysmal failure. Without fundamental political and social
reforms and lacking an economic model that integrates the millions displaced,
terrorized and excluded, there is no military strategist or strategy, no matter
how well funded and directed by Washington which will end the civil conflict.
The
first step toward a resolution of this half-century conflict is the recognition
that Colombia is in the midst of a civil war, not a ‘war on terror’. The second is to release the protagonists of
the peace process, Simon Trinidad and his comrade ‘Sonia’ as a concrete move
toward a humanitarian prisoner exchange and confidence building measure opening
the way to full-scale peace negotiations.
Paradoxically,
the end of the Colombian blood letting could begin in Washington, in a Federal
Courtroom, or possibly in the US Congress with the recognition that the US is
an armed party in Colombia’s civil war, that their combatants are prisoners of
war and that their ultimate release depends on recognizing the limits of US
military power (and that of its Colombian client) and that a diplomatic,
negotiated agreement is the only realistic option.
I
look forward to joining with such artists and intellectuals as Denzel
Washington, Oliver Stone, Michael Moore, Noam Chomsky and Angela Davis, named
in the FARC appeal in a common effort to pressure the US government to agree to
exchanging imprisoned guerrillas (both here and in Colombia) for rebel-held
prisoners, including the three American combatants.
Writings 
(And
a Reply to the FARC)
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