The decision made by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to halt his Mahdi Army’s attacks on occupation forces and Iraqi security is likely to be considered the single most promising breakthrough for the US military in Iraq. Although the move comes ahead of several reports to be presented to the US Congress later this month, the decision was ultimately an outcome of a long-brewing intersectarian conflict between Shiite Iraqis, which will further complicate the devastating American failure in Iraq,
Al-Sadr’s decision followed the widespread clashes at Karbala on August 26, during one of the holiest Shiite festivals. Despite various accusations of outside involvement, the clashes were apparently Shiite through and through, involving militant members of the Badr Brigade of the Islamic Supreme Council (lead by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, a duel ally of the US and Iran) and al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.
Both of these groups are Shiite, but they differ significantly in terms of their loyalty to Iran: al-Sadr, although backed by Iran, often invokes an Iraqi national sentiment, while the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council is unabashedly pro-Iran. While the latter has been heavily involved both in the sectarian killings and the massacres of (mostly Sunni) civilians, it coordinates most of its work with the US military, and is in fact heavily represented in the Iraqi army, police and intelligence.
Yet, it is the armed wing of the Islamic Supreme Council that is affiliated with the Shiite high authority Ali al-Sistani, and both hold unquestionable allegiance to Iran. The US also claims to fight Iran’s agents in Iraq (who are blamed for the development of most destructive types of guerrilla warfare tactics) and yet Iran plays an uncontested role in determining the overall policies of the ruling Shiite parties in Iraq — who are willing collaborators with the US military.
Al-Sadr’s recent decision was, predictably, welcomed by the Americans,
who are likely to take any opportunity to prove the successes of their
most recent operations. Top official Gen. David Petraeus has already
boasted about the troop surge leading to a reduction in sectarian
fighting. Statistics, however, directly contradict such claims. Figures
from the Associated Press show that the month of August registered the
second highest civilian death toll in Iraq — 1,809 civilians — since
the US invasion of March 2003. The sharp rise is largely attributed to
the quadruple suicide bombings on August 14, near the Syrian border,
which killed 520 people.
The significance of that incident — aside from its devastating death
toll — is of less consequence than the inner Shiite fighting,
considering that the targeted group is a small minority that played
next to no part in the raging conflict. However, it will most likely be
underlined further by the US to detract from the fact that their once
reliable allies in Iraq are now engaged in a perplexing fight over
control of the southern part of the country, where most of the oil
wealth is concentrated. Southern Iraq is also important to groups vying
for power because the city of Basra directly borders Iran, the main
ally for Iraqi Shiites and their major source of political validation,
and Najaf and Karbala, two of the holiest cities for Shiites around the
world are located in the south (the recent clashes in Karbala were
about controlling these shrines). With the British vacating their
positions in Basra, Shiite groups, who had hitherto displayed a degree
of unity in their fight against Sunnis, are now increasingly likely to
lock horns; those who control the south seem set to emerge as the
future power brokers of the country.
Although capable of inflicting widespread damage, al-Sadr’s chances of
becoming this power broker are slim. For one, his Shiite rivals receive
greater backing from Iran, which has displayed a largely Machiavellian
attitude towards the situation in Iraq, choosing never to bid on the
underdog. The advent of the Americans has also worsened the position of
the Sadrists as they became largely excluded from all government
institutions. The new Iraqi hierarchy favored the followers of
al-Hakim, who apparently represented a more dominant and perhaps more
trustworthy (from an American point of view) branch of Shiites.
However, despite his seemingly erroneous strategies and media
depictions as a ‘radical’, al-Sadr has actually adopted a very careful
balancing act. He has continued to appeal to his Shiite followers in a
way that sets him apart from al-Sistani, while simultaneously
maintaining good relations with al-Sistani and Iran. He has even
occasionally appeared sympathetic to the plight of the Sunnis.
Yet his relative political shrewdness could hardly bridge the gap
between the various Shiite groups, which remains essentially
ideological and an extension of the theological contention between the
Hawza followers of al-Sistani and the followers of Mohammad Sadiq
al-Sadr, Muqtada’s father. The divide between the two religious Shiite
schools is as real as ever and the new economic woes and power
struggles are likely to bring back to the fore – and further fuel —
these differences. With Badr Brigade claiming 70,000 strong militiaman
and al-Mahdi counting over 50,000, both groups are overwhelmed with
fear and mistrust; under these circumstances, the prospect of
co-existence seems bleak.
We know very little of why al-Sadr decided to send the al-Mahdi army
into hibernation. He claims that his militias are being infiltrated by
Iran, but this is unconvincing given that al-Sadr uses Iran as a
personal escape whenever his safety is threatened at home. The US
military continues to crack down on his followers, and the Iraqi
military, mostly controlled by his rivals, are carrying mass arrests in
al-Sadr city and elsewhere. A lenient al-Sadr may well inspire revolt
amongst his followers and send the inner Shiite fight on an early and
destructive path, or he might find himself compelled to resume the
fight on behalf of his own group. Both scenarios would be bad news for
the Americans, who would be forced to watch an escalating Shiite power
struggle in a country they supposedly control.
Ramzy Baroud is a Palestinian-American author and editor of
PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been published in numerous
newspapers and journals worldwide. His latest book is The Second
Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People's Struggle (Pluto Press,
London). Read more about Baroud at his website ramzybaroud.net
Writings 
The decision made by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to halt his Mahdi Army’s attacks on occupation forces and Iraqi security is likely to be considered the single most promising breakthrough for the US military in Iraq. Although the move comes ahead of several reports to be presented to the US Congress later this month, the decision was ultimately an outcome of a long-brewing intersectarian conflict between Shiite Iraqis, which will further complicate the devastating American failure in Iraq, 
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