Turkey and Latin America have experienced many similar historical and contemporary political processes and socio-economic changes despite significant cultural and historical differences.
For example, Turkey is the center of a former empire, an Islamic country and member of NATO — Latin America is none of those. For purposes of this article, I want to focus on the contemporary socio-economic and political similarities and differences.
Both Turkey and Latin America have passed form bourgeois-national-statist development models beginning during the 1930s and ending approximately in the latter half of the 20th century. Both Turkey and most countries of Latin America have been ruled by neoliberal regimes. Neoliberalism came to Latin America a decade earlier (1970s) and more intensely than Turkey (1980), but has produced very similar class polarizations. In both areas neoliberalism has led to massive privatizations and the denationalization of banks, industry, telecommunications and other strategic sectors. The process of neoliberalization has passed through three phases in both regions. The first phase of neoliberalism took place shortly after a military coup. Privatization was accompanied by massive corruption, crises, deepening inequalities and the emergence of a kleptocratic state.
The second wave of neoliberalism emerging from the corruption and decadence of the preceding phase was characterized by greater dependence on the IMF and World Bank and attempts to accelerate privatization through stabilization programs to create the bases for the large-scale, long-term invasion of foreign capital.
The third wave of neoliberalism began in the new millennium with the coming to power of neoliberals who combine deepening subordination to foreign capital with ‘poverty programs’ to neutralize popular opposition and incentives to activate the provincial ‘national bourgeoisie.’
In Latin America the first wave of neoliberalism coincides with the military dictatorships of Chile’s Pinochet (1973-1989), Argentine Generals (1976-1984), Uruguay (1972-1985), Bolivia (1971-1984) and Peru (1991-2001). In Turkey the comparable period is the military coup (1980), the military-civilian regime of Turgut Ozal (1983-89) and the unstable coalition regimes from1990-1999.
These regimes laid the groundwork for the neoliberal counter-revolution, by violently suppressing all popular, socialist and militant trade unions, parties and movements. The first wave neoliberals created the beachheads for future large-scale privatization. Because of massive corruption, mismanagement, incompetence and internal political conflicts, combined with inflation and popular revulsion, the first wave neoliberal regimes went into crisis, leading to the second wave of neoliberalism.
The second wave of neoliberal regimes in Latin America
combined greater dependence on the IMF, a government of technocrats,
finance capital with policies designed to reduce inflation in order to
attract foreign capital. In Turkey, the second wave of neoliberalism
includes the Bulent-Ecevit-Kemal Dervis regimes (especially March
2001-August 2002) and the first government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan
(2003-2007). In Latin America this second wave coincides with the rise
of ex-populists and ex-Marxists turned neoliberals who criticized
neoliberalism in their election campaigns but who deepened and extended
privatization and de-nationalization once in power. In Argentina, the
Peronist President Menem (1980-1989), Brazil ’s Cardoso (1994-2002),
Peru ’s Toledo (2001-2006) and Alwyn and Lagos in Chile (1990-2005)
represented this trend. The second wave of neoliberalism in Latin
America led to a major crisis and breakdown, leading to popular revolts
and the overthrow of several neoliberal presidents in Ecuador (2000,
2003 and 2005), Argentina (2001), and Bolivia (2003 and 2005) as well
as the election of radical nationalist populist Hugo Chavez in
Venezuela (1999). In Turkey, the crisis of 1999-2001 led to the
election of Ecevit who proceeded to subordinate Turkey to the IMF and
appointed former World Bank official Kemal Dervis as Minister of the
Economy. Turkey ’s 2001 economic crisis, unlike Latin America, did not
lead to a massive popular uprising. Despite this important difference,
the crisis of neoliberalism both in Latin America and Turkey led to the
rise of pseudo-populist neoliberals (the ‘third wave’), who combined a
‘welfare’ ideology and promotion of the ‘national bourgeoisie’ with the
privatization and de-nationalization of all strategic sectors of the
economy.
Erdogan in Turkey, Lula in Brazil and
Kitchner in Argentina, all combine a rhetoric of social paternalism
with right-wing ‘free market’ practices.
The third wave of
neoliberalism has benefited from high world market prices for export
commodities (metals, agricultural products, energy etc.) and an
expanding world economy. But the internal class, ethnic and regional
inequalities have deepened.
In Turkey and Latin America the
current neoliberal presidents (unlike the past) have several
advantages: they have well-organized party apparatuses which reach into
popular sectors, have well-funded ‘welfare’ or ‘poverty’ programs to
buy the votes of the poorest classes and have been able to
disarticulate the left through co-option and selective repression.
Nevertheless, the third wave of neoliberalism faces several severe
challenges from within and below and from the appearance of a
successful alternative model. In Latin America, the advance of
Venezuela’s President Chavez on the road to ‘21st century socialism’
with the nationalization of petroleum, telecommunications and massive
free health and education programs has secured widespread popular
support from the Latin American masses. Chavez’ progressive socializing
policies successfully refute the propaganda that neoliberalism is the
‘only alternative.’ Secondly, major movements of trade unions, urban
poor and peasants are on the move again — in Brazil the landless rural
workers and public employee unions are now in opposition to Lula. In
Argentina and Chile, the teachers and other public sector unions are
demanding a greater share of the growing revenue of the state. In
Bolivia, President Evo Morales is pressured by the right wing oligarchy
and by leftist workers: he must turn left or face defeat by the right.
In Ecuador and Peru, the mass movements through massive public
demonstrations are challenging the reactionary social democratic
regimes.
Equally serious, the financial crises of the US and
Europe are having a negative impact on the economies of Turkey and
Latin America, weakening the ‘social’ neoliberals.
A new phase
of class conflict and social mobilization is challenging the ‘third
wave’ neoliberals. In Latin America, it has a bold face in President
Chavez, a mass base among the urban and rural poor, and especially with
the public employees faced with budget cuts and privatizations.
In Turkey, the left faces the task of winning over the millions of poor
migrants in the cities and countryside influenced by Erdogan’s
‘populist’ Islamist image. However as his regime is clearly dominated
by urban technocrats tied to financial capital — it is only a question
of time when the mask of ‘benign conservatism’ falls and the true face
of cruel neoliberalism is revealed.
Despite historical and
cultural differences Turkey and Latin America are part of the
neoliberal cycle of expansion and crisis. Like Latin America, the
response in Turkey will depend on the unity of diverse social forces in
a socialist program. In Latin America the wave of popular revolts
includes peasant, workers, unemployed workers, indigenous peoples,
Afro-Latinos, women, public employees and progressive Christians. In
the Turkish context, popular revolts will result from the unity of
workers, Kurds, Alavi, peasants, urban poor, People’s Houses,
progressive Muslims and public employees. Fundamental to the successful
outcome of these struggles is opposition to US, European and Israeli
imperialism and their wars against Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Afghanistan
and Venezuela. Anti-imperialist struggles can only succeed by
confronting their local Turkish and Latin American collaborators —
first and foremost Erdogan in Turkey and Lula in Brazil.
James Petras,
a former Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York,
owns a 50-year membership in the class struggle, is an adviser to the
landless and jobless in Brazil and Argentina, and is co-author of
Globalization Unmasked (Zed Books). His latest book is The Power of
Israel in the United States (Clarity Press, 2006). His forthcoming book
is Rulers and Ruled (Bankers, Zionists and Militants (Clarity Press,
Atlanta). He can be reached at: jpetras@binghamton.edu. Read other
articles by James, or visit James's website.
Writings 
Turkey and Latin America have experienced many similar historical and contemporary political processes and socio-economic changes despite significant cultural and historical differences. 
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