To understand Hamas takes, as I found out, a significant amount of reflective thought while reading Mishal and Sela’s
The Palestinian Hamas.
It is not an easy ‘pop’ read, being more inclined to the academic and
sociological manner of examining what is as much, if not more, a social
movement as it is a militant terrorist group. Written by two Israeli
academics, Shaul Mishal, Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv
University, and Avraham Sela, with a PhD from Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, this portrait presents a very sympathetic and surprisingly
positive analysis of the Hamas movement.
Commonly perceived as being solely dedicated to the physical
elimination of Israel by violent means, the authors used a series of
very ameliorative words to describe the social and political
“realpolitik” of Hamas: flexible, innovative, adaptable, conciliatory,
resilient, accommodating, tolerant, pragmatic. These descriptions would
flatter any political movement and ideology and with the support of
concrete examples throughout Hamas’ history, the authors document a
movement that has creativity, political savvy, intelligence, and a
social conscience. Even less of a surprise then that Hamas first won
the legitimate election, and then won the mini civil war to “pre-empt”
a Fatah take over (how quickly they learn from their occupiers and
oppressors!).
The over-riding word from the above list is flexibility. Operating from
a position of weakness, opposed by the PLO/Fatah and later by the PA,
manipulated and attacked by Israeli forces, and struggling with their
own internal divisions of “inside” leaders and “outside” leaders (those
in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon), the overall strategy had to remain
flexible to changing circumstances and changing facets of power. While
the book is not about the PLO it does mention that they too struggled
with the same divisions, with the same adversary and “became a symbol
of Palestinian national identity and of aspirations for independence
and statehood.” In 2000, the time of the first edition, the authors
concluded “The history of Hamas’s [sic, passim] relations with the PLO,
and later with the PA, shows that seeming rivals and enemies can find
ways to coexist even if they cannot resolve basic conflicts.”
In the preface to the 2006 edition, there is recognition that “while
the al-Aqsa Martyrs [PLO militant group] and other groups could match
Hamas’s military activities…none of them…could compete with Hamas’s
system of social services.” From that Hamas realized that its “success
among the people in the local government elections represents…common
trust in their ability to provide efficient and clean-handed
government.” Following the election, Israel, supported by the
international community, mainly the U.S., Canada, and the EU, denied
the validity of the elections. To add to these complications, Fatah
proved reluctant to join in a coalition government, and the PA’s
treasury was empty and not about to be replenished through its usual
foreign aid and Israeli collected taxes. Success was certain not to
follow.
Israel initially gave tacit support to Hamas, hoping to counteract some
of the progress being made by the PLO on the political front. From the
start Hamas “employed a system of consultation and opinion sharing
based on committees that represent a spectrum of figures and groups,”
established initially as a “social movement” with its “main energies
and activities…focussed on providing social and communal services
through well-administrated web of institutions, from clinics,
kindergartens, and schools to a blood bank and welfare services such as
the distribution of food and other basic commodities.”
All that leads to the counter-intuitive statement - in light of the
media presentations - that Hamas’ rise to power “through a democratic
process is an unprecedented phenomenon in the Arab Muslim countries,”
and leading to the fear from Jordan, Egypt, and the Saudis that their
success “will bring about an Islamic radicalization that could threaten
their own political stability.” Ah yes, democracy is messy at its best
and needs to be squelched whenever it threatens the powers that be.
From these overall perspectives the authors discuss how this
flexibility and willingness to view the situation in terms of
“realpolitik” has affected the group throughout their history. Hamas
philosophy is discussed as it relates to the historical developments at
different times in their short history. The changing political
landscape, the overriding position of being in a subordinate position
to both the PLO/Fatah and more so to Israeli occupation, reveals a
strong streak of pragmatic action and social democracy.
Having taken the militant pre-emptive action that they did in Gaza,
Hamas remains conciliatory to the PLO/Fatah, revealing Abbas as being
not much more than an Israeli marionette wishing it could become flesh.
What the end result of it all is may be just as surprising to everyone
as the democratic election win and the militant consolidation win, but
if the powers that be could recognize Hamas’ flexibility and
pragmatism, some actual progress could occur. I don’t expect that, my
own personal realpolitik, something else will come along to surprise
everyone.
The Palestinian Hamas presents a sympathetic portrait of the
movement, a movement with surprising – again the word – flexibility and
a high degree of democracy, counter to the western Orientalist view
that Islam cannot be democratic. It is a tightly written narrative,
focussing almost exclusively on the Hamas, and introducing components
of Israeli action and ideology, and that of the PLO, only as necessary
for understanding Hamas itself. It is not a primer, as the reader
should at least be familiar with the big picture of the PLO/Fatah and
its struggles with Israel, and the bigger picture of Arab insecurity
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ with their relations with both the PLO and
Israel. The authors have done a wonderful job of examining a modern
phenomenon without the prejudice of western media and politicians, a
highly recommended read.
[1
“Hamas against foreign troops” English.Aljazeera. Saturday, June 30, 2007
Book Reviews 
In consideration of current events with Hamas’ military takeover of Gaza, this book on the Palestinian Hamas is very timely. It would have been more timely in its original version in 2000 at the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada. With precise foresight into the possible problems of armed conflict between Hamas and Fatah, aided and abetted by Israel, it is almost prescient in nature. It is not prescient however, but a thorough accounting of the structure and movement (political, social, and military) of Hamas, the apparent prescience deriving from the always present fear by Hamas that their less powerful position vis a vis Fatah and the PLO could one day lead to an armed struggle that their perceptions said Fatah could easily win.
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